The Paradox of a Fundamental: A Simple Proof of Idealism

Jackson Capper | 5 January 2019

For any phenomena to possess a characteristic means that it exhibits at least some consistent effect on associated phenomena. It is good enough to realise a posteriori that the effect probably exists, given that we do not have an infinite sample. However, its consequences on surrounding phenomena is consistent enough to give it the benefit of doubt. The nature of the characteristic may be a composite characteristic of more fundamental mechanics, if not fundamental of nature. But, what does it mean to be fundamental of nature.

Suppose a chair is pushed across the floor virtue of some force applied upon it. As a consequence of the force, we would say that the chair’s acceleration, sustained velocity, and it’s eventual new position is ultimately the carrying out of causal processes. All chairs succumb to the same process when they are pushed. This we shall call horizontal causation, that is, phenomena of consistency. Causation does not need to be reduced further, as without consistency, there would be no possible concept of causality. Apparent consistency in any physical process is the very essence of causation. We only need to consider a circumstance that has no consistency. Suppose a soup of colours swirling with not apparent consistency or underlying mechanics. We would be hard-pressed to say that any particular colour is causing another colour unless some pattern emerged.

\( \text{Causation} \equiv \text{Consistent Phenomenon} \)

In almost all causes of causality, we observe that there are underlying mechanics. In fact, the causation of characteristics being that of composition of more fundamental mechanics is a consistency in itself. For example, the earth’s characteristic of tidal forces is an emergence of the more fundamental effect of gravity. Or suppose the burning of wood, an emergence of energy exchanges in the hydrocarbons of the wood. We see that an apparent characteristic or causal system arises from more fundamental mechanics. This we shall term metacausation or vertical causation to contrast it with the regular type of horizontal causation.

\( \text{Causation} \subset \text{Underlying Mechanics} \\ \text{Underlying Mechanics} \subset \text{Consistent Phenomenon} \\ ∴ \text{Underlying Mechanics} \subset \text{Causation} \)

Essentially, horizontal causation can cause emergent causation. Thus, vertical causation (the cause of causes) is a valid distinction.

For anything to exist characteristically, there must be a fundamental mechanism from which those characteristics can emerge. The universe is most certainly of this form. The universe is not a continuous, infinite substance. It has matter, motion, gravity, and electromagnetism. Thus, our macroscopic universe must emerge from a more fundamental set of faculties. For example, the phenomena of fire is quite characteristic. It turns matter into gas and exhibits heat and radiation as a result.

The ancient Greeks suspected this of course, and various models of the atomos were conceived. However, let us take Plato’s atomic solids as an example. While 3D geometric shapes seem to be quite fundamental, they are in fact quite characteristic. For example, they exhibit 3-dimensional qualities. They have size. They have edges and faces. They have surface characteristics. For such shapes to exist, they must consist of something more fundamental in order for these characteristics to arise. For example, the faculty of edge must exist for a Platonic solid to consist of edge characteristics.

Such a problem only gets worse for modern Quantum Mechanics given that the “fundamental” electron has the characteristics of angular momentum, electric charge, and mass. Not to mention the underappreciated properties of spacial position. In any case, the idea of a fundamental anything becomes paradoxical if such a thing has characteristics.

How do we solve the paradox? We could attempt to solve this with an infinite vertical causation (causation in the dimension of emergence), however an infinite number of emergence must be carried out for our present emergence to exist. Our present emergence exists, thus there cannot be an infinite vertical emergence. Alternatively, we can accept that there exists brute facts of the universe. Brute facts are simply physical truisms, faculties that simply exist without any cause at all. However, a brute fact is informational in nature. Materialism becomes a mere conscious rendering of such information. Therefore, any characteristic universe such as ours can only be represented immaterially with information.